Intro
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This, my friends… is the sound of time.
Welcome to Midnight Caravan on the Silk Road.
This isn’t the Silk Road of spice and silk. This is the Silk Road of Time — a winding path through centuries of Chinese history, culture, and philosophy.
I’m Margaritta Polo — your host, your guide, and your fellow traveler on this trail through time.
And I’d like to invite you to join our caravan party, as we journey through endless nights in pursuit of wisdom… and whimsical adventure.
Each evening, we stop the caravan.
We build a fire.
And under starlit skies… we listen to an ancient tale.
You may hear the wisdom of Confucius, or insights from Lao Tzu.
Some nights, we’ll meet clever diplomats and wander through ancient battlegrounds.
Other nights, we may speak of love — like the tale of a kind-hearted man and the white snake spirit who risked everything to be together.
Treat this podcast as a resting place for your mind.
A space to slow down, to reflect, and to rediscover the quiet wisdom of the past.
You don’t need to know anything about Chinese history.
You don’t need a degree in East Asian studies.
Just bring a tired soul… and an open heart.
And I promise, we’ll make the ride worth your while.
So whether you’re listening from Philadelphia, Glasgow, or Cape Town—
Grab your wagon.
Gather your friends or family.
And join us, on this trail through time.
The road is long. The night is young. And a world of lost wisdom is waiting to be found.
So… shall we?
Adaptive English Translation
I, your humble minister, Liu Xiang, report that I have compiled this collection of stories and anecdotes from the Warring States period. These accounts often depict advisors, or "Counsels," traveling between the rival states to offer advice on political maneuvering and inter-state diplomacy. Because the core content revolves around these strategic counsels offered during that era of conflict, I have titled the work Strategies of the Warring States. The historical events and narratives included span from the end of the Spring and Autumn era of the Zhou Dynasty through to the eventual downfall of the Qin Dynasty.
Let me set the stage. Picture the dawn of the Zhou dynasty, founded around 1046 BCE by two revered kings: Wen and Wu. Their rule wasn't built on brute force alone, but on a deep commitment to morality (道德), propriety, and righteousness (礼义). Imagine a realm where education flourished, where ritual and music weren't just entertainment, but tools used to cultivate virtue and shape society. By emphasizing clear social roles and respect within families – promoting filial piety and fraternal respect – they fostered a culture of honesty and trust. So deeply did these principles of benevolence and justice (仁义) permeate the land that, legend tells, the Zhou enjoyed over forty years of profound peace where punishments almost fell silent. Even faraway peoples, hearing of this just rule, willingly acknowledged Zhou authority. Echoes of this time live on in the Book of Songs (诗经), a classic collection celebrating the era's virtues.
But golden ages fade. Generations later, the virtue of Zhou kings began to dim, though the essential framework of their governance held. Fast forward four or five centuries to the Spring and Autumn period (roughly 771–476 BCE). The echoes of Zhou's early greatness could still be heard, but power was shifting. Mighty regional feudal-lords, the so-called Five Hegemons (春秋五霸), arose, overshadowing the Zhou royal court in practical terms, even while paying lip service to the king's rightful authority. After the Hegemons, the moral compass of rulers wavered further, yet pockets of stability remained, often thanks to capable ministers who skillfully guided their states. Diplomacy, cultural exchange through poetry, formal visits between courts, regular assemblies, and sworn alliances still knit the realm (中国) together, however imperfectly. The Zhou king, the Son of Heaven (天子), wasn't entirely powerless, and a sense of shame could still check blatant misconduct at diplomatic gatherings. Smaller states found refuge, and ordinary people could still find a measure of peace. It brings to mind Confucius's later reflection: "If one could govern a state through propriety and deference - what difficulty would remain?" The legacy of Zhou's virtue-based culture, it seems, died hard.
Yet, die it did. As the Spring and Autumn period closed, the wise ministers upholding the old ways passed from the scene. Propriety and righteousness withered. Into this decline stepped Confucius. He tirelessly compiled the wisdom of the past in texts like the Book of Songs and Book of Documents (书经), refined rituals and music, and brilliantly laid out the ideal "Kingly Way" (王道) of just governance. But his wisdom fell on deaf ears. He was, after all, a man without armies or political office. His direct influence reached only his seventy-two core disciples – brilliant minds, yes, but powerless against the tide. The rulers of the age, hungry for power, ignored his call for virtue. The Kingly Way remained an unrealized dream.
Once Confucius was gone, the dam truly broke. Powerful families seized thrones, like the Tian clan in Qi, or carved up entire states, like the six families who dismembered Jin. Morality evaporated. Social order crumbled. Rulers like Duke Xiao of Qin cast aside propriety, embracing warfare; they rejected benevolence, adopting deceit – all in a naked pursuit of power. Suddenly, usurpers were hailed as kings, and states built on treachery flourished. A vicious cycle began: success through ruthlessness bred imitation. States turned on each other like wolves, large devouring small. Warfare became a constant plague, armies marching year after year, leaving fields drenched in blood. Society itself fractured: fathers and sons grew estranged, brothers turned on each other, families were torn apart. Life became cheap. Virtue seemed utterly dead, and the darkness only deepened with time.
This brutal free-for-all eventually coalesced into the Warring States period (战国时代, c. 475–221 BCE), dominated by seven major powers and five lesser ones, locked in a relentless struggle. Greed and ambition knew no bounds. Each state made its own rules, ignoring any higher authority – the Zhou Son of Heaven was a forgotten figurehead, the stabilizing influence of hegemons a distant memory. Only military might mattered; victory alone determined who was right. War raged endlessly, fueled by increasingly elaborate deception. In this climate, who had time for morality? States threw up fortifications, traded hostages to secure fragile alliances, and signed treaties destined to be broken.
Little wonder, then, that scholars like Mencius (孟子) and Xunzi (荀子), who still preached the Confucian ideal of governing through virtue, found themselves sidelined. The men of the hour were the itinerant strategists, masters of political calculus and the intricate dance of inter-state alliances. These were the "inter-state alliance strategists" (纵横家), figures like the brilliant Su Qin (苏秦) and Zhang Yi (张仪). They peddled grand strategies known as the Vertical (合縱) and Horizontal (連橫) alliances, capable of tilting the entire balance of power. Su Qin's Vertical Alliance aimed to unite the realm against the menacing rise of Qin. Zhang Yi's Horizontal Alliance urged states to bandwagon with Qin. The fate of kingdoms hung on their words; states that hired them gained instant influence, while those they abandoned faded. Would Su Qin's coalition prevail, perhaps leading to Chu's supremacy? Or would Zhang Yi's logic win out, crowning Qin the ultimate king?
For a crucial period, Qin, though clearly the rising superpower, was held in check. Su Qin's Vertical Alliance united the six other major states, effectively boxing Qin in. Intimidated, Qin kept its armies west of the mountain passes, and the realm saw roughly twenty-nine years without major wars of annexation. Yet, Qin's inherent strengths – its strategic location, its growing power – remained a magnet for the ambitious. (Ironically, Su Qin himself, the tale goes, first tried to sell a pro-Qin Horizontal Alliance strategy to Qin. Only after being rebuffed did he become the architect of the anti-Qin coalition). When Su Qin eventually died, the persuasive Zhang Yi found his moment, convincing state after state to abandon the Vertical Alliance and throw their lot in with Qin through his Horizontal Alliance.
The dominoes fell. Inheriting the gains of six previous rulers, commanding vast resources from a secure heartland, and advised by countless strategists, the king of Qin – soon to be Qin Shi Huang, the First Emperor – launched his final campaigns. One by one, the remaining states fell, and by 221 BCE, the realm was unified under Qin's iron fist. But this empire, forged in fire and deception, lacked a true foundation. Qin ruled by terror and raw power, not trust or shared values. They famously burned the classics and buried scholars alive, rejecting the moral examples of the legendary sage-kings Yao and Shun and the founders of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties.
Under the Second Emperor, the rot deepened. The ruler was isolated, his supposed benevolence never reaching the people, their cries never reaching the throne. Mistrust poisoned the court. Moral guidance vanished. The state apparatus decayed. Seeing no justice, the people lived in fear and desperation. It took only fourteen years for this mighty empire to crumble into dust amid rebellion. A stark lesson, Liu Xiang implies, in the hollowness of power without virtue, especially when compared to the enduring legacy of the early Zhou.
Confucius saw it clearly: "Lead the people with administrative regulations and regulate them by punishments, and they will stay out of trouble, but that’s only because they seek to avoid punishment instead of growing a true sense of shame. Lead them with virtue and regulate them by propriety, and they will develop a sense of shame and strive to do what’s right." That inner compass, that sense of shame (耻), is the bedrock of a healthy society. If rulers themselves embrace deceit just to cling to power, how can they possibly inspire anything better in their people? From this perspective, wasn't Qin's spectacular collapse utterly inevitable?
Original Chinese Text
护左都水使者光禄大夫臣向言：
所校 中《战国策 》书，中书余卷，错乱相糅莒。又有国别者八篇，少不足。臣向因国别者，略以时次之，分别不以序者以相补，除复重，得三十三篇。本字多误为半字，以「赵」为「肖」，以「齐」为「立」，如此字者多。中书本号，或曰《事语》，或曰《长书》，或曰《修书》。臣向以为战国时游士，辅所用之国，为之策谋，宜为《战国策》。其事继春秋以后，讫楚汉之起，二百四十五年间之事，皆定，以杀青，书可缮写。
叙曰：周室自文武始兴，崇道德 ，隆礼义，设辟雍泮宫痒序之教，陈礼乐弦歌移风之化。叙人伦、正夫妇，天下莫不晓然论孝悌之义，敦笃之行，故仁义之道满乎天下，卒致之刑错四十余年，远方慕义，莫不宾服，《雅》、《颂》歌咏，以思其德。下及康、昭之后，虽有衰德，其纲纪尚明。及春秋时，己四五百载矣，然其余业遗烈，流而未灭。五伯之起，尊事周室。五伯之后，时君虽无德，人臣辅其君者，若郑之子产，晋之叔向，齐之晏婴，挟君辅政，以并立于中国，犹以义相支持，歌说以相感，聘觐以相交，期会以相一，盟誓以相救。天子之命，犹有所行。会享 之国，犹有所耻。小国得有所依，百姓得有所息。故孔子曰：「能以礼让为国乎，何有？」周之流化，岂不大哉！及春秋之后，众贤辅国者既没，而礼义衰矣。孔子虽论《诗》、《书》，定礼乐，王道粲然分明，以匹夫无势，化之者七十二人而已，皆天下之俊也，时君莫尚之，是以王道遂用不兴。故曰：「非威不立，非势不行。」
仲尼既没之后，田氏取齐，六卿分晋，道德大废，上下失序。至秦孝公，捐礼让而贵战争，弃仁义而用诈谲，苟以取强而已矣。夫篡盗之人，列为侯王；诈谲之国，兴立为强。是以转相仿效，后生师之，遂相吞灭，并大兼小，暴师经岁，流血满野，父子不相亲，兄弟不相安，夫妇离散，莫保其命，闵然道德绝矣，晚世益甚。万乘之国七，千乘之国五，敌侔争权，盖为战国。贪饕无耻，竞进无厌；国异政教，各自制断；上无天子，下无方伯，力功争强，胜者为右；兵革不休，诈伪并起。当此之时，虽有道德，不得施谋；有设之强，负阻而恃固；连与交质，重约结誓，以守其国。故孟子、孙卿儒术之士，弃捐于世，而游说权谋之徒，见贵于俗。是以苏秦、张仪、公孙衍、代、厉之属，生从横短长之说，左右倾侧。苏秦为从，张仪为横；横则秦帝 ，从则楚王；所在国重，所去国轻。
然当此之时，秦国最雄，诸侯方弱，苏秦结之，时六国为一，以傧背秦。秦人恐惧，不敢窥兵于关中，天下不交兵者，二十有九年。然秦国势便形利，权谋之士，咸先驰之。苏秦初欲横，秦弗用，故东合从。及苏秦死后，张仪连横，诸侯听之，西向事秦。是故始皇因四塞之固，据崤、函之阻，跨陇、蜀之饶，听众人之策，乘六世之烈，以蚕食六国，兼诸侯，并有天下，杖于谋诈之弊，终无信笃之诚，无道德之教，仁义之化，以缀天下之心。任刑罚以为治，信小术以为道。遂燔烧诗书，坑杀儒士，上小尧、舜，下邈三王。二世愈甚，恵不下施，情不上达；君臣而疑，骨肉相疏；化道浅薄，纲纪败坏；民不见义，而悬于不宁。抚天下十四岁，天下大溃，诈伪之弊也。其比王德，岂不远哉！孔子曰：「道之以政，齐之以刑 ，民免而无耻；道之以德，齐之以礼，有耻且格。」夫使天下有所耻，故化而可致也。苟以诈伪偷活取容，自下为之，何以率下？秦之败也，不亦宜乎！
战国之时，君德浅薄，为之谋策者，不得不因势而为资，据时而为画。故其谋扶急持倾，为一切之权，虽不可以临国教化，兵革救急之势也。皆高才秀士，度时君之所能行，出奇策异智，转危为安，运亡为存，亦可喜，皆可观。护左都水使者光禄大臣向所校《战国策》书录。
Glossary (in case you are interested)
Strategies of the Warring States (战国策 - Zhànguó Cè): Wikipedia Link - The title of the historical work compiled by Liu Xiang, containing advice and stories from the Warring States period.
Liu Xiang (刘向) (77–6 BCE): Wikipedia Link - The Han Dynasty scholar who compiled the Strategies of the Warring States and wrote this preface.
Warring States Period (战国时代 - Zhànguó Shídài) (c. 475–221 BCE): Wikipedia Link - The era of intense conflict and political maneuvering covered in this text, characterized by the decline of morality and rise of pragmatism.
Spring and Autumn Period (春秋时代 - Chūnqiū Shídài) (c. 771–476 BCE): Wikipedia Link - The period preceding the Warring States, marked by declining Zhou authority but still retaining some order and respect for propriety.
Zhou Dynasty (周朝 - Zhōu Cháo) (c. 1046–256 BCE): Wikipedia Link - China's longest dynasty; its early period is idealized in the preface as an age of virtue, contrasted with the later decline.
Qin Dynasty (秦朝 - Qín Cháo) (221–206 BCE): Wikipedia Link - The short-lived first imperial dynasty that unified China after the Warring States; the preface critiques its reliance on force and deceit, leading to its quick collapse.
Confucius (孔子 - Kǒngzǐ) (551–479 BCE): Wikipedia Link - China's most influential philosopher, whose ideals of moral governance (the "Kingly Way") are presented as the antithesis to Warring States practices.
Inter-state Alliance Strategists (纵横家 - Zònghéngjiā) / Itinerant Strategists: Wikipedia Link - The advisors specializing in diplomacy and strategy central to the Strategies; their pragmatic and often morally ambiguous actions are a key theme. (Note: Link is to the "School of Diplomacy").
Propriety and Righteousness (礼义 - Lǐyì): Wikipedia Link 1 / Wikipedia Link 2 - Fundamental Confucian concepts concerning proper social conduct (Li) and moral duty (Yi), seen as essential for order and declining through the periods discussed.
Benevolence and Justice (仁义 - rényì): Wikipedia Link - Core Confucian virtues emphasizing kindness and fairness, associated with the idealized early Zhou and absent in the later periods. (Note: Link is for Ren, a key component).
Su Qin (苏秦) (Died 284 BCE): Wikipedia Link - A key strategist exemplifying the Vertical Alliance, aimed against Qin's dominance.
Zhang Yi (张仪) (Died 309 BCE): Wikipedia Link - A key strategist exemplifying the Horizontal Alliance, aimed at aligning with Qin.
Vertical Alliance (合縱 - hézòng): Wikipedia Link - The anti-Qin coalition strategy crucial to the power dynamics described.
Horizontal Alliance (連橫 - liánhéng): Wikipedia Link - The pro-Qin alignment strategy crucial to the power dynamics described.
Qin Shi Huang (秦始皇) (259–210 BCE): Wikipedia Link - The "First Emperor" who unified China but whose dynasty, built on force and rejecting past virtues (book burning, etc.), quickly fell.
Qin (秦): Wikipedia Link - The state whose rise, methods, unification, and fall are central to the historical narrative and moral argument of the preface.
Book of Songs (诗经 - Shījīng): Wikipedia Link - Key classic text representing the culture of the virtuous early Zhou, later compiled by Confucius and targeted by Qin book burning.
Book of Documents (书经 - Shūjīng): Wikipedia Link - Key classic text representing the history and ideals of early rulers, compiled by Confucius and targeted by Qin book burning.
Five Hegemons (春秋五霸 - Chūnqiū Wǔbà): Wikipedia Link - Powerful lords representing the intermediate stage of declining Zhou authority during the Spring and Autumn period.
Duke Xiao of Qin (秦孝公 - Qín Xiàogōng) (Ruled 361–338 BCE): Wikipedia Link - Ruler symbolizing the shift towards prioritizing state power and military strength over traditional Zhou virtues.
Mencius (孟子 - Mèngzǐ) (c. 372–289 BCE): Wikipedia Link - Major Confucian thinker whose virtue-based teachings were ignored during the Warring States, highlighting the era's values.
Xunzi (荀子 - Xúnzǐ) (c. 310 – c. 238 BCE): Wikipedia Link - Major Confucian thinker also active but ignored during the Warring States.
Son of Heaven (天子 - Tiānzǐ): Wikipedia Link - The title of the Zhou king, whose declining authority is part of the preface's narrative of decay.
King Wen (周文王 - Zhōu Wén Wáng) and King Wu (周武王 - Zhōu Wǔ Wáng): Wikipedia Link 1 / Wikipedia Link 2 - Founders of the Zhou dynasty, representing the idealized starting point of virtue.
Sage-kings Yao and Shun (尧舜 - Yáo Shùn): Wikipedia Link 1 / Wikipedia Link 2 - Legendary ancient rulers symbolizing peak virtue, whose example was rejected by Qin.
Xia (夏), Shang (商), and Zhou (周) Dynasties: Wikipedia Link 1 / Wikipedia Link 2 / Wikipedia Link 3 - The foundational dynasties whose virtuous founders were also rejected by Qin.
Second Emperor (秦二世 - Qín Èr Shì) (Ruled 210–207 BCE): Wikipedia Link - Qin Shi Huang's successor, whose failure demonstrates the instability of Qin's rule.
Qi (齐): Wikipedia Link - A major state whose internal turmoil (Tian usurpation) exemplifies the chaos after Confucius.
Jin (晋): Wikipedia Link - A major state whose partition exemplifies the chaos after Confucius.
Chu (楚): Wikipedia Link - A major state, the potential beneficiary if Su Qin's anti-Qin alliance had succeeded.
Seven Major Powers / Five Lesser Ones: Describes the fragmented political landscape of the Warring States period (See Warring States Period).
Ritual and Music (礼乐 - Lǐyuè): Wikipedia Link - Key elements of early Zhou culture associated with order and virtue. (Note: Link is for Yayue, ritual court music).
Filial Piety and Fraternal Respect (孝悌 - xiàotì): Wikipedia Link - Core Zhou/Confucian values foundational to the social order that decayed. (Note: Link focuses on Filial Piety).
Disciples (of Confucius): Wikipedia Link - Illustrate Confucius's intellectual influence but lack of political power.
So, let's be clear about the strategists whose words fill this volume. They lived in dark times, advising rulers who often lacked virtue. They couldn't afford idealism; they had to be pragmatic, tailoring their advice to the brutal realities of the moment. Their counsels were often desperate measures – attempts to rescue states from imminent disaster, to prop up collapsing regimes. These were "expedient measures," battlefield triage, not blueprints for enlightened, long-term governance. Yet, the advisors themselves were undeniably brilliant. They possessed an uncanny ability to read situations, gauge their rulers' limits, and devise audacious plans that could snatch survival from the jaws of defeat. For this sheer ingenuity in navigating treacherous times, their actions command attention, and their stories, collected here, are compellingly worthy of reading.
This concludes the preface to the collated Strategies of the Warring States, submitted by Liu Xiang.